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The “Princelings”* and the Banks: When Does a 
Legitimate Business Practice Become Criminal 
Corruption in Violation of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act? 
Beverley Earle† & Anita Cava‡ 
Abstract: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) prohibits the bribery of 
foreign public officials. When does hiring a relative of a foreign official cross the 
line into criminal activity in violation of the Act? We suggest that there should not 
be an absolute prohibition on hiring qualified relatives of foreign officials. 
Rather, there must be clear safeguards to prevent quid pro quo arrangements that 
further corruption.  
We examine the lack of case precedents under the statute and look to cases under 
other statutes that examine the definition of quid pro quo to look for analogies to 
the FCPA.  We conclude with how the DOJ and SEC could clarify this murky line 
between legal and illegal activity, thus giving companies operating abroad 
certainty that their hiring will not be the subject of FCPA enforcement action.
 
 * Compare Bo Zhiyue, Who are China’s Princelings?, THE DIPLOMAT, Nov. 24, 2015, 
http://thediplomat.com/2015/11/who-are-chinas-princelings/ (“The children of veteran communists who 
held high-ranking offices in China before 1966, the first year of the Cultural Revolution, are commonly 
called ‘princelings.’ There are princelings by birth–sons and daughters of former high ranking officers 
and officials of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)–and princelings by marriage. Princelings by birth 
could also be further divided into subcategories: princeling politicians, princeling generals, and princeling 
entrepreneurs.”), with Princelings, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php? 
title=Princelings&oldid=731158483 (last visited Dec. 19, 2016) (“The term was coined in the early 
20th century, referring to the son of Yuan Shikai (a self-declared emperor) and his cronies. It was later 
used to describe the relatives of the top four nationalist families; Chiang Kai-shek’s kin, Soong Mei-ling’s 
kin, Chen Lifu’s kin, and Kong Xiangxi’s kin. After the 1950s, the term was used to describe Chiang 
Ching-kuo, son of Chiang Kai-shek, and his friends in Taiwan. Today’s princelings include the children 
of the Eight Elders and other recent senior national and provincial leaders. . . .”). 
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 I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)1 criminalizes the offering of 
something of value to a foreign official to obtain or retain business.2 For the 
most part, the U.S. government has interpreted this prohibition through plea 
bargains, Opinion Releases, and the 2012 Resource Guide to the FCPA.3 In 
a few instances, the courts have offered guidance on the statute’s 
interpretation.4 Research reveals that few companies challenge the 
government’s view by going to trial, preferring instead to make a plea deal 
that will limit both financial exposure and public relations problems, and, 
obviously, stem hemorrhaging legal costs.5 An exception to this approach, 
however, appears to be on the horizon and permits closer scrutiny of the 
government’s interpretation of the anti-corruption law. 
In 2013, JP Morgan Chase and Co. came under government scrutiny for 
its practice of hiring sons and daughters of foreign officials to help it secure 
business in China.6 Reportedly, the government has expanded the probe to 
include other banks as it appears the practice is commonplace.7 The company 
has hired former top prosecutor Mark Mendelsohn, who reportedly is 
preparing a “white paper” that is intended to persuade the SEC that its 
position is too far-reaching.8 Other banks involved in the investigation 
 
 1  15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 (2012). 
 2  15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), -3(a) (2012). 
 3  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. 
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (2012), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-
fraud/legacy/2015/01/16/guide.pdf [hereinafter RESOURCE GUIDE]. 
 4  See infra, Part III.A. 
 5  See Nathan Vardi, The Bribery Racket, FORBES (June. 7, 2010, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/global/2010/0607/companies-payoffs-washington-extortion-mendelsohn-
bribery-racket.html (discussing how companies hire investigators, turn over evidence to the government 
in FCPA cases by self-reporting and making plea deals). 
 6  See Emily Glazer, Dan Fitzpatrick & Jean Eaglesham, J.P. Morgan Knew of China Hiring Concerns 
Before Probe, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 23, 2014, 11:56 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/j-p-morgan-was-
aware-of-overseas-hiring-concerns-before-u-s-probe-1413998056.  
 7  Hugh Son, JPMorgan China Hiring Probe Spreads to Five More Banks, NYT Says BLOOMBERG 
(Dec. 7, 2013, 8:26 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-12-08/jpmorgan-china-hiring-
probe-spreads-to-five-more-banks-nyt-says (discussing expansion of probe of companies hiring sons and 
daughters of Chinese officials). 
 8  See Jean Eaglesham, Emily Glazer & Ned Levin, Wall Street Pushes Back on Foreign Bribery 
Probe, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 29, 2015, 7:24 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/wall-street-pushes-back-on-
foreign-bribery-probe-1430349863 (mentioning Mark Mendelsohn’s “White Paper”); Ned Levin, J.P 
Morgan Hired Friends, Family of Leaders at 75% of Major Chinese Firms it Took Public in Hong Kong, 
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 30, 2015, 8:45 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/j-p-morgan-hires-were-referred-by-
china-ipo-clients-1448910715 (discussing in great detail the information the bank put together in response 
to the federal inquiry); however more recently a settlement is rumored to be in discussion, see Ben Protess 
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include Bank of New York Mellon, Citigroup Inc., Credit Suisse Group AG, 
Deutsche Bank AG, Goldman Sachs Group Inc., Morgan Stanley, and UBS 
AG.9 
This paper considers the following question: When does hiring a 
qualified and competent person who may be related to foreign officials cross 
the line into illegal conduct? Assuming that credentials from elite schools are 
viewed as baseline qualifications for top jobs in business, restricting the 
applicant pool in a way that eliminates the progeny of foreign officials will 
surely have negative consequences for business. A prohibition on the hiring 
of these individuals would effectively preclude businesses from hiring local 
talent. This would be especially problematic in developing countries, where 
the children of elite have the most access to educational opportunities, 
particularly when it comes to studying abroad. Does the company need only 
avoid specific quid pro quo actions to escape illegal conduct, or must the 
company avoid the “appearance of impropriety” as well? 
We examine cases under other statutes to see if there is any applicability. 
For example, in United States v. Blagojevich,10 the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals agreed with a former governor of Illinois and reversed his conviction 
on several counts.  The 2015 opinion makes a distinction between 
“logrolling”—horse trading for jobs—and decisions involving private 
monetary gain.11 The former, the court noted, is common in everyday 
politics, whereas the “swap of an official act for a private payment” is 
illegal.12 The opinion references Skilling v. United States and honest services 
fraud.13 We also look at the “donations for admissions” conundrum in 
universities, recent insider trading cases, and Supreme Court analysis of 
corruption to illuminate the dilemma in the FCPA’s “princeling” inquiry. 
We conclude by suggesting where the line might be drawn between 
legal hiring and illegal corruption. 
 
& Alexandra Stevenson, JP Morgan May Face New Scrutiny in China Hiring Case, N. Y. TIMES ( Sept. 
22, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/23/business/dealbook/jp-morgan-may-face-new-scrutiny-
in-china-hiring-case.html?emc+eta1&_r=0 (discussing reported settlement with federal prosecutors). 
 9  See Eaglesham, Glazer & Levin, supra note 8. 
 10  794 F.3d 729 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 11  Id. at 734–38. 
 12  Id. at 734. 
 13  Id. at 736 (“[T]he holding of Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 130 S.Ct. 2896, 177 L.Ed.2d 
619 (2010), prevents resort to § 1346 to penalize political horse-trading. Skilling holds that only bribery 
and kickbacks violate § 1346. So unless political logrolling is a form of bribery, which it is not, § 1346 
drops out.”). 
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 II.  FCPA IN BRIEF 
Over the past few years, the U.S. government has significantly ramped 
up its enforcement of the FCPA, a law enacted in 1977 to address bribery in 
the global marketplace.14 The FCPA was a response to a national scandal 
regarding Lockheed paying bribes to a Japanese public official in order to 
secure a contract for the sale of Lockheed’s jets.15 The statute prohibits the 
giving of “anything of value” to a foreign public official to assist “in 
obtaining or retaining business.”16 It also requires publically traded 
companies to maintain accurate books and records regarding any payments 
that flow to public officials.17 
The law, enforced by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC), languished on the books for decades.  
Between 1980 and 2005, the DOJ brought only sixty-six cases,18 while the 
SEC brought twenty-three enforcement actions.19 Both entities drew much 
comment regarding their lax attitude in trying to police a generally accepted 
way of doing business worldwide.20 Since 2005, however, the approach has 
shifted to one of proactive enforcement21 and industry-wide investigations.22 
For example, marketing practices of the pharmaceutical industry23 and the 
 
 14 Shearman & Sterling LLP, Recent Trends and Patterns in the Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, SHEARMAN & STERLING FCPA DIGEST (Jan. 2015), http://www.shearman.com/ 
~/media/Files/NewsInsights/Publications/2015/01/Recent-Trends-and-Patterns-only-LT-010515.pdf 
(discussing enforcement actions). 
 15  Mike Koehler, The Story of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 929, 934–35 
(2012).  
 16  15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (2012). 
 17  15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (2012). 
 18  See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Chronological List, https://www.justice.gov/criminal-
fraud/chronological-list (last updated Feb. 17, 2016) (listing all of the enforcement actions brought each 
year, including the years 1980 through 2005). 
 19 SEC Enforcement Actions: FCPA Cases, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/ 
spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-cases.shtml (last visited Dec. 19, 2016). 
 20  See generally Harvey L. Pitt, The FCPA—Best Practices for a New Climate, COMPLIANCE WEEK 
(Apr. 24, 2007), https://www.complianceweek.com/news/news-article/the-fcpa—best-practices-for-a-
new-climate#.WFl8CbGZO3U (“Although enforcement of the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA has 
been sporadic, the SEC and Department of Justice are bringing cases with renewed vigor and seeking the 
imposition of unprecedented fines.”); see also Shearman & Sterling LLP, supra note 14, at 3.  
 21  See generally Cortney C. Thomas, Note, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Decade of Rapid 
Expansion Explained, Defended, and Justified, 29 REV. LITIG. 439 (2010). 
 22  2010 marked the peak year of corporate enforcement actions under the FCPA. See Shearman & 
Sterling LLP, supra note 14, at 1.  
 23  Stay Tuned for More, FCPA PROFESSOR (May 2, 2011), http://fcpaprofessor.com/stay-tuned-for-
more-2/, reprinted in Mike Koehler, FCPA Investigations of Pharmaceutical Industry Abound, CORP. 
COMPLIANCE INSIGHTS (May 5, 2011), http://corporatecomplianceinsights.com/fcpa-investigations-of-
pharmaceutical-industry-abound/ (discussing the pharmaceutical industry experience with the FCPA). 
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aviation services industry24 have been particularly scrutinized, resulting in 
headline-grabbing settlement agreements.25 More recently, the DOJ and the 
SEC are examining the banking industry and its efforts to secure business 
overseas.26 Some commentators note that one explanation for the recent 
popularity of FCPA enforcement actions is the financial gain to the 
government.27 
Further, over the past five years, target companies have begun to shift 
away from the long-standing strategy of entering into settlement agreements 
with the government rather than fighting FCPA charges.28 Indeed, there have 
been a few notable instances in which the courts have dismissed FCPA 
prosecutions on the grounds of overreaching or abuse of discretion. 
 III.  CURRENT CONTEXT OF DOJ AND SEC ENFORCEMENT 
 A.  JP Morgan Chase & Co. 
JP Morgan Chase & Co. has long been interested in business in China 
and has used different methods to promote this agenda. Reportedly, emails 
reviewed by the Wall Street Journal revealed a concern about anti-bribery 
compliance as early as 2006 while “pursuing recruits”29 and contained the 
phrase “bribing for business.”30 Further, it appears that anonymous 
allegations about improprieties at the bank raised concerns and were 
addressed in 2011.31 In addition, CEO James Dimon reportedly was 
cognizant of these anti-corruption measures.32 
SEC filings by JP Morgan reveal that in August of 2013, the government 
intensified its scrutiny of the bank’s “Sons and Daughters program,” which 
intentionally hired adult children of the ruling elite in China.33 In an 
 
 24  See SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, supra note 14, at 18. 
 25  See generally Vardi, supra note 5; Paul Barrett, Pleas Deals Are Easy, Juries Are Hard, 
BLOOMBERG (July 23, 2015, 3:49 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-07-23/u-s-
prosecutors-keep-losing-trials-in-overseas-corruption-cases (discussing the Government’s string of 
losses in FCPA cases); see also, e.g., Son, supra note 7. 
 26  Son, supra note 7. 
 27  “Total”ly Milking The FCPA Cash Cow?, FCPA PROFESSOR (June 3, 2013), 
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/totally-milking-the-fcpa-cash-cow.  
 28  This practice has drawn much commentary regarding the lack of judicial pronouncement and 
policing of the government in its FCPA decision-making.  See Barrett, supra note 25. 
 29  See Glazer et al., supra note 6. 
 30  Id. 
 31  Id. 
 32  Id. 
 33  Id. For another view of the offspring, see generally Christopher Beam, Children of the Yuan 
Percent: Everyone Hates China’s Rich Kids, BLOOMBERGBUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 30, 2015), 
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interview, Dimon said that 
[I]t ha[d] been a “norm of business for years” for banks to hire “sons 
and daughters of companies” and to give them “proper jobs” without 
violating the law. 
“But we got to figure out exactly how to create a safe harbor for that 
so you don’t . . . end up getting punished . . . .”34 
Indeed, an employee in the bank’s compliance section, Chris Charnock, 
suggested requiring more approvals, more training sessions and “more 
disclosures ‘to identify if any member of a deal has a personal/family 
relationship with the issuer/agency.’”35 
Of note in this regard is the chain of events involving the China 
Everbright Group and its subsidiary, China Everbright Bank, Co. In August 
2013, the New York Times reported that JP Morgan had hired the son of 
China Everbright Group’s CEO and then was awarded “multiple coveted 
assignments.”36 A few months later, the bank withdrew from the Everbright 
IPO, a “$2 billion Hong Kong listing.”37 While not clear whether the decision 
was made to avoid an appearance of impropriety, it is possible that it was 
influenced by anti-corruption measures adopted pursuant to internal 
recommendations. 
There is some suggestion that the investigation has uncovered a 
“smoking gun”—a spreadsheet connecting hires to specific deals—but this 
has not been verified.38 It has also been reported that four individuals 
connected to the program have been fired.39 The investigation is ongoing. 
The bank reportedly shut down the infamous “Sons and Daughters” program 
 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2015-10-01/children-of-the-yuan-percent-everyone-hates-
china-s-rich-kids (discussing the “fuerdai” or the idle rich). 
 34  Glazer et al., supra note 6 (Dimon was referring to sons and daughters of heads of companies and 
foreign officials when he stated “sons and daughters of companies”). This strategy is not new. Since the 
early 2000s, banks globally have been “hiring people whose connections can be professionally useful.” 
Michael Flaherty et al., U.S. Probe of JPMorgan China Hiring Involves Ex-premier’s Daughter: NYT, 
REUTERS (Nov. 14, 2013, 12:06 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-jpmorgan-china-hiring-
idUSBRE9AD0ZW20131114.  
 35  Glazer et al., supra note 6.   
 36  Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Ben Protess & David Barboza, Hiring in China by JPMorgan Under 
Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2013, 8:01 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/08/17/hiring-in-
china-by-jpmorgan-under-scrutiny/?_r=0. 
 37  Elzio Barreto & Lawrence White, JPMorgan Withdraws from $2 Billion China Everbright Bank 
HK Listing: Source, REUTERS (Nov. 19, 2013, 4:51 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-jpmorgan-
everbright-idUSBRE9AI09620131119; see also Glazer et al., supra note 6. 
 38  Steven Perlberg, A JP Morgan Spreadsheet Could Be the Smoking Gun in an Ongoing Antibribery 
Investigation, BUS. INSIDER, (Aug. 29, 2013, 10:30 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/jp-morgans-
antibribery-spreadsheet-2013-8.  
 39  See Eaglesham et al., supra note 8.  
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as it was previously constituted.40 As of this date, there has been no 
settlement. 
Interestingly, during the ongoing investigation into its “Sons and 
Daughters” program, JP Morgan hired a former prosecutor, Mark 
Mendelsohn, to write a white paper on their opposition to the government’s 
position.41 Seen as a key figure in FCPA interpretation at the DOJ,42 
Mendelsohn describes himself as “the ‘architect and key enforcement official 
of the of DOJ’s modern Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enforcement 
program.’”43 Bloggers have described him as the “prosecutor, judge, and 
jury” of FCPA settlements at the DOJ.44 
 B.  Bank of New York Mellon 
In 2015, the SEC announced that Bank of New York Mellon was the 
first settlement in the princeling investigations.45 The SEC’s published cease 
and desist order states that the investigations involved actions occurring 
between 2010 and 2011.46 Officials X and Y, government officials connected 
to a Middle Eastern Sovereign Wealth Fund, sought internships for three 
individuals—one son of each official and a nephew of another. The 
internships were suspect for a number of reasons. First, although all were 
college graduates, none of the three qualified for the normal intern program 
because they did not have the required grade point average. Second, they 
were not enrolled in any graduate program, the normal requirement for 
college graduates. Third, the three were slated to return to the Middle East 
rather than be recruited for permanent positions. BNY hired the three without 
interviewing or meeting them and set up “bespoke internships.”47 Emails 
stating “I want more money for this”48 seem to suggest that in return for 
creating these three special six month internships, BNY executives expected 
more funds to be deposited in the bank. Two interns were placed in Boston 
and one in London for approximately six months; two of them were paid and 
 
 40  Id. 
 41  Id. 
 42  Wall Street Firms Push Back Against FCPA Scrutiny, FCPA PROFESSOR (May 5, 2015), 
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/wall-street-firms-push-back-against-fcpa-scrutiny.  
 43  Id. (quoting Mendelsohn’s law firm biography). 
 44  Id. 
 45  Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges BNY Mellon with FCPA Violations 
(Aug. 18, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-170.html.  
 46  The Bank of New York Mellon Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 75720, 2015 WL 4911514 (Aug. 
18, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2015/34-75720.pdf (order instituting cease-and-desist 
proceedings.). 
 47  Id. at 6. 
 48  Id. at 5. 
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one was unpaid, although BNY paid costs such as legal and visa filing fees.49 
The interns were described in the filing as having frequent absences and not 
being hard-working; in short, they were “less than exemplary employees.”50 
The cease and desist order found that BNY was “corruptly providing 
valuable internships to relatives of foreign officials from Middle Eastern 
Sovereign Wealth Fund in order to assist BNY Mellon in retaining and 
obtaining business.”51 It also noted that BNY did not have internal controls 
to detect whether employees were bribing officials.52 
As part of BNY’s offer of settlement accepted by the SEC, the bank 
revamped their hiring procedures to address the issue of hiring officials’ 
relatives, including: 
• Centralizing HR process for all hires; 
• Adopting a Code of Conduct where every employee certifies 
that he or she does not use an ad hoc hiring process; 
• Requiring every applicant to disclose whether he or “she or a 
close personal associate is or has recently been a government 
official”; 
• An affirmative answer requires additional review by the bank’s 
anti- corruption office.53 
BNY settled with no admission, disgorged $8.3 million, and agreed to 
pay $1.5 million prejudgment interest and a $5 million penalty—a fine 
totaling $14.8 million.54 
During this time, BNY held $55 billion in assets. Around the time of the 
discussions regarding the interns, the Middle Eastern Sovereign Wealth Fund 
transferred $689,000 to BNY.55 The evidence was replete with emails in 
which individuals made incriminating admissions such as: “Its [sic] silly 
things like this that help influence who ends up with more assets / retaining 
dominant position.”56 
Voluminous comments followed the announcement of the BNY 
settlement. In his FCPA Professor Blog, Michael Koehler noted that most of 
the banks will follow suit and adopt policies designed to monitor princeling 
hiring because they do not want to risk criminal prosecution.57 Debevoise & 
 
 49  Id. at 6–7. 
 50  Id. at 7. 
 51  Id. at 9. 
 52  Id. at 8–9.  
 53  Id. at 9. 
 54  Id.  
 55  Id. at 4.  
 56  Id. at 6. 
 57  Wall Street Pushes Back Against FCPA Scrutiny, FCPA PROFESSOR May 5, 2015), 
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/category/bank-of-new-york-mellon (“When push comes to shove, these 
banks are not going to risk a criminal indictment to litigate a disputed legal issue.”). 
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Plimpton, an international business law firm, suggested that, given the fact 
that one was an unpaid internship, the SEC skirted the issue of “value” by 
stating “the internships were valuable work experience, and the requesting 
officials derived significant personal value in being able to confer this benefit 
on their family members.”58 
The disgorgement here seems disproportionate: BNY had not secured 
any business advantage directly linked to the interns, unless the $689,000 
deposit is a result of their status. Nonetheless, despite having already made 
changes to its hiring program, the bank opted to limit its legal fees and did 
not contest the penalty. Simply put, BNY did not try to argue that this activity 
was simply “relationship building,” which is not illegal.59 
 C.  Spaulding-Stephenson Colloquy 
In the spring of 2015, respected law professors and FCPA bloggers 
Matthew Stephenson and Andrew Spaulding engaged in a thoughtful 
colloquy regarding whether or not “giving a benefit to a third party count[s] 
as bribing an official?”60 Ultimately, Professor Spaulding—who had taken a 
position based on “experience” and “Opinion Releases” that it does not61—
changed his mind. He acknowledged that both would agree that to employ a 
princeling would be improper “if there exists specific evidence that both 
offeror (the employer) and offeree (the official) believed the job had 
nonmonetary value for the official.”62 The rub, however, is that this standard 
is both difficult to define and even more difficult to implement. As Professor 
Stephenson acknowledges: 
The FCPA, perhaps even more than other white-collar criminal 
 
 58  Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, The SEC Announces First FCPA Enforcement Action Based on 
Allegedly Improper Hiring of Relatives of Foreign Officials, 7 FCPA UPDATE (2015), 
http://www.debevoise.com/~/media/files/insights/publications/2015/08/fcpa_update_august_2015.pdf.  
 59  Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, Corrupt Intent, Relationship Building, and Quid Pro Quo Bribery: 
Recent Domestic Bribery Cases, 3 FCPA UPDATE (2011), http://www.debevoise.com/~/media/ 
files/insights/publications/2011/09/fcpa%20update/files/view%20the%20update/fileattachment/fcpa_up
date_sept_2011.pdf. 
 60  Matthew Stephenson, Can Giving a Benefit to a Third Party Count as Bribing a Foreign Official? 
Maybe Yes, Maybe No, or Maybe So?, GLOBAL ANTICORRUPTION BLOG (Jan. 8, 2015), 
http://globalanticorruptionblog.com/2015/01/08/can-giving-a-benefit-to-a-third-party-count-as-bribing-
a-foreign-official-yes-no-or-maybe-so. Professor Stephenson links four posts by Professor Spaulding in 
recounting their discussion. Id.  
 61  Andy Spaulding, JP Morgan Revisited: What’s a Princeling Supposed to Do?, FCPA BLOG (Jan. 
7, 2015, 5:18AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2015/1/7/jp-morgan-revisited-whats-a-princeling-
supposed-to-do.html.  
 62  Andy Spaulding, Not Every Princeling Job is a ‘Thing of Value’, FCPA BLOG (Jan. 12, 2015, 
8:18AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2015/1/12/not-every-princeling-job-is-a-thing-of-value.html.   
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statutes, is extremely fact-sensitive—an inevitable consequence of the 
fact that corruption, by its nature, is hard to define in simple terms. 
Some conduct that is innocent, or at least lawful, when done in certain 
ways in certain settings, can become unlawful when done in other 
ways in other settings. . . .”63 
The professors were trying to avoid relying on a quid pro quo analysis, 
which lets too many cases slip by because the facts do not meet that 
requirement. However, with respect to the princeling analysis, it appears that 
the SEC is resorting to a vaguer “appearance of impropriety” standard, which 
makes doing business much more difficult.64 
 IV.  BROADER CONTEXT OF THE LAW 
 A.  FCPA 
 1.  FCPA Opinions 
The Department of Justice has issued sixty Opinion Releases on the 
subject of the FCPA.65 Thirteen are relevant to the issue of giving something 
of value to a foreign official.66 While the amount of money involved is not 
dispositive, in certain situations the DOJ appears to overlook transactions that 
could be seen as something of value in the interest of humanitarian concerns. 
The following catalogues the thirteen cases chronologically:67 
1. 80-01: A law firm wanted to give $10,000 a year to two adopted 
children of an elderly honorary official. The actual parents were 
living government employees but described as having minimal 
involvement with the children.  The request did not state how much 
total money would be transferred. The DOJ found no FCPA 
violation. 
2. 82-04: The company hired an agent who was a brother of a foreign 
official in the very department where a generator sale was made.  
The company had the agent sign a form declaring he would not pay 
a commission to third party. The DOJ found no FCPA violation. 
 
 63  Stephenson, supra note 60. 
 64  See Gideon Yaffe, A Republican Crime Proposal That Democrats Should Back, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 
12, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/12/opinion/a-republican-crime-proposal-that-democrats-
should-back.html (discussing how the Republican proposal to require mens rea in crimes would aid white 
collar criminal defendants as well as the poor and the minorities, who are often tagged with possession of 
a gravity knife that opens quickly without knowing it is a criminal offense). 
 65  Opinion Procedure Releases, JUSTICE.GOV (Updated June 17, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/ 
criminal-fraud/opinion-procedure-releases. 
 66  Id. 
 67  Id. 
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3. 84-01: A firm wanted to hire a marketing representative who was 
related to a head of state and who managed “certain of the head’s 
business affairs and investments.” The potential hire had a 
legitimate track record and signed statements agreeing to comply 
with the FCPA. The DOJ found no FCPA violation. 
4. 95-03: A U.S. company wanted to form a joint venture with a 
partner who was a relative of the leader of the country. The relative 
was a “prominent business person” and also was “a foreign 
government official.” They had the foreign official sign the terms, 
which included an assertion that his “duties do not involve any 
decisions to award business in connection with government 
projects . . . [,]” and if his duties changed, the official had a duty to 
notify the requesting company. The DOJ found no FCPA violation. 
5. 2000-01: A U.S. law firm had a foreign partner who was appointed 
as a foreign government official. The firm wanted to continue 
certain benefits like insurance and guarantee of return to full 
partnership for the individual. The firm could not represent clients 
before the fellow’s agency, would have no business in country x 
and the official would recuse himself from any matters involving 
the firm. The DOJ found no FCPA violation. 
6. 2001-02:  A U.S. company and a foreign company formed a 
consortium. They engaged in business with a government senior 
official in education. All agreed to abide by the FCPA and the 
official recused himself from any business involving the company 
before the agency. The DOJ found no FCPA violation. 
7. 2004-01 A law firm and the Foreign Ministry (China) wanted to 
sponsor a comparative law seminar held in Beijing. The firm said 
it had no business before officials. The DOJ found no FCPA 
violation. 
8. 2004-03: Twelve officials from a foreign ministry and a U.S. law 
firm wanted to sponsor a meeting in the U.S to discuss law and 
regulations. The officials planned to stop in three cities without 
spouses accompanying them. The DOJ found no FCPA violation. 
9. 2004-04: A U.S. company wanted to co-sponsor a nine day study 
tour for officials on “drafting law on mutual insurance” (the 
requestor had expertise and conducted business but did not plan to 
organize a company in that country, however it did plan to apply 
for a business license eventually).  The company acknowledged 
that “under current practice . . . [it] must demonstrate that it has 
been supportive of the country’s socio-economic needs, proactive 
in the development of the insurance industry, and active in 
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promoting foreign investment.” The DOJ found no FCPA 
violation. 
10. 2006-01: A company wanted to contribute $25,000 to a regional 
customs bureau in the Ministry of Finance of an African country to 
help buttress enforcement of anticounterfeit laws. The DOJ found 
no FCPA violation. 
11. 10-01: A company had a U.S. government contract to work in a 
foreign country. It wanted to hire a foreign official and he or she 
would be director of the facility. The foreign official then had a 
different job. The DOJ found no FCPA violation. 
12. 12-01: The requestor wanted to represent a foreign country as a 
lobbyist and wanted to hire a consultant who was a member of the 
royal family to advise him. The opinion quoted the Liebo case in a 
footnote and left open the possibility of action if after the fact there 
was improper influence. The DOJ found no FCPA violation. 
13. 13-01: A partner in a U.S. law firm represented country A and had 
a personal friend, a foreign official, in the Office of the Attorney 
General. The partner wanted to pay personally the medical 
expenses of a daughter of the foreign official ($20,500). He would 
pay the facility directly. Although the law firm would be hired on 
one new matter, the firm claimed no impact on future business. The 
opinion quoted Liebo, and found no corrupt intent. The DOJ found 
no FCPA violation. 
These cases could be grouped in the following way. Three deal with 
study tours (2004-1, 2004-03, and 2004-04) and the direct connection to 
future business seemed minimal. However, despite there being no immediate 
business outcome, these instances could be “relationship building,” a practice 
that, like the hiring of relatives, builds good will over the long term. 
Nonetheless, the DOJ seemed comfortable because there was no obvious 
quid pro quo; oddly, it did not impose a mechanism to determine whether in 
fact the study tours led to business in the next two to three years. However, 
is it “of value” under the statute to build good will?  The DOJ did not deem 
it necessary to make this inquiry. One case (2006-01) deals with a 
contribution not for a study tour but to assist in a country’s education about 
counterfeit trafficking—an issue that benefits U.S. businesses as well as 
domestic and other international businesses. 
Three Opinion Releases deal with hiring individuals who actually are 
government officials (2001-1, 2001-02, 2010-01). Again, because there did 
not appear to be any current deal on the table, the government acquiesced to 
the arrangement. One case deals with a company making a contribution to 
the government to help with an anticounterfeiting measure (2006-01).  
Arguably, this was acceptable because the measure could not only help the 
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company, but also serve the public’s interest. 
Two cases (1980-01, 2013-01) involve payments for children of 
government officials. Although these are similar to the princelings in that 
there is a benefit of possible value to a public official, the 2013 case 
evidenced a humanitarian concern as the payment was for medical expenses. 
Nonetheless, it seems obvious that the favor curried by such largesse would 
be long remembered—perhaps even more than an internship. 
Four Opinion Releases (1982-04, 1984-01, 1995-03, 2012-01) involve 
relatives of foreign officials. These track closely to the princeling problem as 
well. The prospective employer simply asked individuals to attest to 
compliance with the FCPA and saw this as resolving any impropriety. The 
DOJ apparently concurred. It is hard to see why these were approved when 
the BNY case had a different outcome. Given the chilling effect of the current 
investigations and the BNY settlement, relatives of foreign officials will have 
more difficulty getting work in international business unless the government 
offers more guidance. There appears to be a great deal of government 
flexibility in the Opinion Releases which may be misleading in the current, 
more draconian climate. 
While Opinion Releases are not official precedents, they do provide 
guidance upon which business should be able to rely; presumably, major 
departures from decision trends should be explained by the DOJ. This is why 
there needs to be additional clarity from the government. 
 2.  FCPA Cases 
There is a dearth of cases litigated under the FCPA. However, from the 
few that exist, we can discern some guiding principles that perhaps inform 
the princeling debate. 
 a.  United States v. Liebo (1991) 
Richard Liebo served as the vice president of NAPCO, which sold 
military equipment internationally.68 Liebo met Captain Tiemogo of the 
Niger Air Force and offered to make “some gestures” to him if Tiemogo was 
able to get the contract approved. Liebo met Tiemogo’s cousin Barke in D.C. 
and offered (1) to pay for Barke’s honeymoon flight to the amount of $2,028 
and (2) to create an account of $30,000 for Barke in the name of E. Dave 
(Barke’s girlfriend).69 
 
 68  United States v. Liebo, 923 F.2d 1308, 1309 (8th Cir. 1991). 
 69  Id. at 1309–10. 
EARLE & CAVA (DO NOT DELETE)  3/6/2017  6:20 PM 
Princelings and Banks 
37:107 (2017) 
121 
NAPCO had contracts for airplane parts totaling over $2,500,000 from 
this venture, but Liebo’s conviction was limited to violating the FCPA’s 
bribery provisions—for having purchased the airplane ticket.70 Although he 
was able to win a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence,71 Liebo 
was again convicted, this time on the charges of aiding and abetting 
violations of the antibribery provisions of the FCPA and making a false 
statement to the Defense Security Assistance Agency.72 Liebo received an 
eighteen-month suspended sentence and was ordered to perform community 
service.73 Barke testified that he believed this ticket was a personal gift, an 
unsuccessful attempt to blunt the allegation of corrupt intent.74 
 b.  SEC: In the Matter of Schering-Plough (2004) 
In 2004, the SEC filed a complaint against Schering-Plough Corporation 
(S-P) for FCPA violations related to S-P’s “charitable” donations.75 The SEC 
also instituted public administrative proceedings against S-P.76 Schering-
Plough Poland, a branch office of the subsidiary of Schering-Plough, was 
alleged to have made payments totaling 315,800 zlotys (approximately 
$76,000) to a Polish charity, Chudow Castle Foundation.77 The founder and 
president of the Foundation was also the director of the Silesian Health Fund, 
one of sixteen government health authorities.78 “The Silesian Health Fund 
was a government body that, among other things, provided money for the 
purchase of pharmaceutical products and influenced the purchase of those 
products by other entities, such as hospitals, through the allocation of health 
fund resources.”79 S-P Poland hoped to have a share of that business. 
 
 70  Id. at 1310. 
 71  Id. at 1313–14. 
 72  United States v. Liebo, No. 4-89-76 (D. Minn. Jan. 28, 1992), http://www.justice.gov/sites/ 
default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2012/06/22/1992-01-31-liebor-judgment.pdf.  
 73  Id. But see conflicting information from Did Richard Liedo [sic] Win or Lose?, FCPA PROFESSOR 
(Dec. 23, 2013), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/did-richard-liedo-win-or-lose (“In the re-trial, Liebo was 
convicted of aiding and abetting FCPA anti-bribery violations and making a false statement to the 
DSAA.  He was then sentenced to three years’ probation, two months’ home detention, and 400 hours of 
community service.”). 
 74  Liebo, 923 F.2d at 1310. 
 75  SEC v. Schering-Plough Corp., Litigation Release No. 18740 (June 9, 2004), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18740.htm.  
 76  In re Schering-Plough Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 49838 (June 9, 2004), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-49838.htm. 
 77  Complaint, at 1, SEC v. Schering-Plough Corp., No. 1:04CV00945 (D.D.C. June 9, 2004), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/comp18740.pdf. The Chudow Castle Foundation was a 
charitable organization developed “to restore castles and other historic sites in the Silesian region of 
Poland.” Id. at 2.   
 78  Id. at 2. 
 79  Id. 
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Between 1999 and 2002, S-P made thirteen payments to the Foundation, 
all below the manager’s HPP purchasing authority thus the expenditures 
would not require additional authorization.80 The S-P manager who made the 
payments to the Foundation further tried to conceal the nature of the 
transactions by providing false medical justifications for the payments.81 The 
SEC focused on books and records violations, not antibribery provisions.82 
Rather than fighting the SEC, Schering-Plough agreed to pay a $500,000 civil 
penalty and to hire an independent consultant to study their processes, make 
recommendations, and then implement them.83 No time limits appear in the 
settlement.84 
The Order does not specify what S-P received in return for the $76,000 
donation. Accordingly, just as in some of the princeling cases, there is no 
clearly identified quid pro quo and yet the parties agreed to the 
settlement.85Although this case involves a charitable contribution similar to 
several of the Opinion Releases, it is distinguishable because there were 
thirteen payments structured to fall within the manager’s authority without 
additional authorization. Further, the founder of the charity held a position 
with power over what was directly in line with what SP needed—purchase 
of pharmaceuticals. Thus, the transaction appeared corrupt. However, no 
individuals were charged in this matter. 
 
 80  Id. at 2–3. The largest payment was 40,000 zlotys ($10,067), while the lowest payment was 3,000 
zlotys ($777). Id. at 3.  
 81  Id. at 3. The money given to the Foundation supposedly went to finance research of various 
diseases, including viral hepatitis, lung cancer, skin cancer, coronary disease, and infectious diseases of 
the liver. Id. 
 82  Id. at 5 (alleging violations of Sections 13(b)(2)(A) and 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act). The 
Exchange Act requires public companies to maintain records “which, in reasonable detail, accurately and 
fairly reflect the transactions” of the company. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A) (2012). The Act further 
mandates that such companies have internal controls “sufficient to provide reasonable assurances” that 
transactions are properly executed and recorded. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B) (2012). 
 83  SEC v. Schering-Plough Corp., Litigation Release No. 18740 (June 9, 2004), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18740.htm; In re Schering-Plough Corp., Exchange Act 
Release No. 49838 (June 9, 2004), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-49838.htm.  
 84  In re Schering-Plough Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 49838 (June 9, 2004), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-49838.htm.  
 85  Pursuant to the settlement agreements, Schering-Plough did not admit or deny the allegations in 
the SEC’s complaint, nor did Schering-Plough admit or deny the SEC’s findings that Schering-Plough 
violated the record-keeping provisions of the Exchange Act. SEC v. Schering-Plough Corp., Litigation 
Release No. 18740 (June 9, 2004), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18740.htm; In re Schering-
Plough Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 49838 (June 9, 2004), https://www.sec.gov/ 
litigation/admin/34-49838.htm. 
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 c.  United States v. Kay 
In 2007, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the convictions of David Kay and 
Douglas Murphy, who worked for a U.S. company that exported rice to 
Haiti.86 Kay and Murphy “paid Haitian officials to reduce duties and taxes on 
their rice.”87 The irony is that in cooperating on a civil matter, Kay informed 
outside counsel that he and Murphy had taken these actions.88 The lawyers 
then told the company directors, who informed the government, which started 
this criminal investigation.89 Kay received a thirty-seven month prison 
sentence followed by two years of supervised release and a fine of $1,300.90 
Murphy received a sixty-three month sentence followed by three years of 
supervised release and a fine of $1,400.91 
The court rejected the argument that a payment made to reduce taxes 
was in the nature of a permissible facilitation fee. Despite general consensus 
that this is a common practice in Haiti and these men were singled out, the 
convictions were affirmed.92 
 d.  United States v. Esquenazi 
In Esquenazi, the Eleventh Circuit defined instrumentality under the 
FCPA as an “entity controlled by the government of a foreign country that 
performs a function the controlling government treats as its own.”93 Joel 
Esquenazi and Carlos Rodriguez, owners of Terra, a business incorporated in 
Florida, bought phone time from a Haitian company, Telecommunications 
D’Haiti S.A.M. Teleco. They sold the time to U.S. customers for a profit. 
Teleco handled all phone service for Haiti, but then was privatized. Officials 
of Teleco advised the two principals that, in return for a private payment of 
 
 86  United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 2007), reh’g denied, 513 F.3d 461 (5th Cir. 2008), 
cert. denied, 555 U.S. 813 (2008). 
 87  Id. at 439. 
 88  Id. 
 89  Id.; see also Deposition Prep That Lead [sic] to One of the Most Notable FCPA Cases, FCPA 
PROFESSOR (Feb. 19, 2013), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/deposition-prep-that-lead-to-one-of-the-
most-notable-fcpa-cases.  
 90  United States v. Kay, No. 4:01CR00914-001 (S.D. Tex. July 6, 2005), http://www.justice.gov/ 
sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2011/02/16/07-01-05kay-judgment.pdf.  
 91  United States v. Murphy, No. 4:01CR00914-002 (S.D. Tex. July 6, 2005), 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2011/02/16/01-01-05kaym-
judgment.pdf.  
 92  Kay, 513 F.3d at 440–42. 
 93  United States v. Esquenazi, 752 F.3d 912, 917 (11th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 293 (2014). 
See also id. at 920–27 for Judge Martin’s thorough discussion of the definition of “instrumentality.” For 
more information on the Esquenazi case, see generally United States v. Esquenazi: Eleventh Circuit 
Defines “Government Instrumentality” Under the FCPA, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1500 (2015). 
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about $800,000, their debt to Teleco would be reduced by $2,000,000. In 
2009, Esquenazi and Rodriguez were indicted for violating the FCPA 
antibribery provisions, conspiracy, and money laundering.94 In 2011, 
Esquenazi and Rodriguez were convicted and sentenced to fifteen and seven 
years respectively.95 
The appeal focused on the fact that the Haitian individuals Terra dealt 
with were not foreign officials connected to an “instrumentality.”96 
According to the defendants, Teleco was not an instrumentality of the Haitian 
government, thus a required element of an FCPA violation was missing.97 
However, the court considered the enormity of the bribe, the corrupt intent, 
and the history of Teleco (in that it performed a governmental function).98 
The Eleventh Circuit was willing to support the clear finding of the lower 
court and the strong message of fifteen years incarceration, the most severe 
penalty in FCPA history.99 
Following the decision, Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer 
heralded the harsh punishment as a warning to all businesses operating in 
foreign countries: 
This sentence – the longest sentence ever imposed in an FCPA case – 
is a stark reminder to executives that bribing government officials to 
secure business advantages is a serious crime with serious 
consequences . . . . A company’s profits should be driven by the 
quality of its goods and services, and not by its ability and willingness 
to pay bribes to corrupt officials to get business. As today’s sentence 
shows, we will continue to hold accountable individuals and 
companies who engage in such corruption.100 
U.S. Attorney Wilfredo Ferrer seconded Breuer’s remarks, stating, 
 
 94  Esquenazi, 752 F.3d at 917. 
 95  Id. at 920 (“With a criminal history category I, Mr. Esquenazi’s guideline range was 292 to 365 
months’ imprisonment. The district court ultimately imposed a below-guideline sentence of 180 months’ 
imprisonment. Mr. Rodriguez, with a guideline range of 151 to 188 months’ imprisonment, received 84 
months.”). 
 96  Id. at 927–29.  
 97  Id. 
 98  Id. at 930–32, 936–37. 
 99  See Miller Chevalier, FCPA Winter Review 2012, http://www.millerchevalier.com/Publications/ 
MillerChevalierPublications?find=71404#haiti (“The 180-month prison term imposed on Esquenazi is the 
most severe sentence ever imposed in an FCPA prosecution, followed by the 87-month sentence imposed 
on Charles Edward Jumet and the 84-month sentence imposed on Rodriguez.”) (internal citations omitted).  
 100 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Executive Sentenced to 15 Years in Prison for Scheme to Bribe 
Officials at State-Owned Telecommunications Company in Haiti (Oct. 25, 2011), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/executive-sentenced-15-years-prison-scheme-bribe-officials-state-owned-
telecommunications.  
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“Today’s long prison sentences confirm the serious consequences of ignoring 
corporate ethics when doing business abroad . . . . The FCPA ensures that 
American businesses are not up for sale.”101 
The Esquenazi and Kay cases show that the harshest punishments are 
reserved for conduct that involves relatively large sums paid as bribes rather 
than a more modest gesture or one aimed at least in part for the public good 
as in the Liebo or Schering cases respectively. 
 3.  FCPA Resource Guide 2012 
The Resource Guide has a special section addressing the meaning of 
“anything of value.”102 The text focuses on “improper benefit,” yet that is not 
in the statute.103 It mentions “consulting fees,” “commissions,” and 
“expensive gifts” and notes that cash is a red flag—as in cash in the trunk of 
a car.104 Yet in some countries, cash is a method of payment due to problems 
with the banking system and related issues; using cash does not automatically 
mean that an entity is corrupt. The Guide makes reference to the Liebo case 
as an example of payments or gifts to third parties that can be in contravention 
of the statute.105 Also, while charitable contributions are permitted, they 
cannot be a front for nefarious activity, such as bribery.106 Detailed 
safeguards are outlined by example.107 
The Guide also lists “Five Questions to Consider When Making 
Charitable Payments in a Foreign Country.”108 The last question is 
particularly relevant: “Is the payment conditioned on receiving business or 
other benefits?”109 This suggests finding a quid pro quo and yet the Schering-
Plough case did not have a demonstrated quid pro quo. There, a settlement 
ended the matter, just as it did in BNY case. The government’s standard for 
reaching a settlement seems to be an unstated “appearance of impropriety” 
standard rather than the more rigorous quid pro quo standard. While one 
could argue that the weaker standard facilitates more efficient use of 
government resources in negotiating settlements and only ensnares the guilty, 
one could also argue that it over-criminalizes standard business relationship-
building behavior.  It seems appropriate that there should be 
al review of these determinations. 
 
 101 Id. 
 102 RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 3, at 14–19.  
 103 Id. at 14–15. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. at 16 nn.100–01. 
 106 Id. at 17, 19 (referencing the Schering-Plough case). 
 107 Id. at 19. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. 
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 B.  Cases in Other Contexts: Parallels to FCPA Enforcement? 
The message found on a billboard in Springfield, MA makes no 
distinction between international, domestic, private business, and political 
corruption: 
HELP THE FBI 
1-844-NO BRIBE 
STOP CORRUPTION NOW! 
Call or go to tips.fbi.gov to report110 
This unusual billboard reminds us that corruption is not the exclusive 
domain of developing countries. The United States has its share of it in 
various forms. We will consider corruption in non-FCPA contexts to search 
for applicable concepts. Of course, legal issues persist regarding what 
constitutes a crime under the various statutes outside the FCPA context. This 
ambiguity and its current resolution could be helpful in sorting out the 
ambiguity in the FCPA about what constitutes offering something of value 
to a foreign official.111 
 1.  Skilling v. United States and the Honest Services Fraud Statute 
Jeffrey Skilling, convicted for criminally fraudulent activities associated 
with Enron, challenged the honest services fraud statute,112 which provided  
a pillar of his conviction, as being unconstitutionally vague.113 In order 
to understand the parallel between the FCPA and § 1346, one must appreciate 
the historical context of the latter law. 
For many years, the DOJ found judicial support for a broad 
interpretation of the mail and wire statutes, which were enacted to address 
the myriad schemes that rely on such communications to accomplish a 
fraudulent end.114 A line of cases extended the “any scheme or artifice to 
defraud” language of those statutes to apply to public officials who failed to 
 
 110 See Stephanie Barry, As Casino Construction Nears, FBI Anti-Corruption Billboards Pop Up in 
Springfield’s Skyline, MASSLIVE (Apr. 8, 2015), http://www.masslive.com/news/index.ssf/ 
2015/04/fbi_anti-corruption_billboard.html.  
 111 Other scholars have begun to consider this issue.  See, e.g., Jennifer Rodgers & Jacob Watkins, 
Guest Post: The Blagojevich Case and the Line Between Corruption and Horse-Trading, GLOBAL 
ANTICORRUPTION BLOG (Aug. 18, 2015), http://globalanticorruptionblog.com/2015/08/18/guest-post-
the-blagojevich-case-and-the-line-between-corruption-and-horse-trading.  
 112 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2012). 
 113 Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2011).  
 114  See Anita Cava & Brian M. Stewart, Quid Pro Quo Corruption is “So Yesterday”: Restoring 
Honest Services Fraud After Skilling and Black, 12 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J.  1, 4–5 nn.110–15 and 
accompanying text (2012). 
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honor their obligations of loyalty and honest services to the public.115 It did 
not take much imagination for this same notion to be judicially interpreted to 
include white collar crimes. In short order, the honest services fraud 
prosecutions became a big weapon in the government’s enforcement 
arsenal.116 And yet, the cases lent little clarity as to what this intangible right 
to both public and private “honest services” actually meant. 
In 1987, the Supreme Court chose to interpret the mail and wire fraud 
statutes more narrowly, “[r]ather than . . . in a manner that leaves its outer 
boundaries ambiguous and involves the Federal Government in setting 
standards of disclosure and good government for local and state 
officials . . . .”117 Limiting the statute to tangible property rights, the Court 
invited Congress to “speak more clearly” if it wanted to further extend the 
statute’s reach.118 Rather than so doing, Congress “replaced an ambiguously 
interpreted law with a patently vague statute,”119 one that criminalized “a 
scheme or artifice to defraud another of the intangible right to honest 
services.”120 
By the time Jeffrey Skilling petitioned the Supreme Court to hear his 
arguments, the federal Circuit Courts of Appeal had developed very 
different—and often inconsistent—standards to determine the existence of 
honest services fraud in the public sector and had virtually accepted the 
notion that a failure to honor fiduciary duties amounted to criminal corruption 
in the private sector.121 The outcome in Skilling was predictable, especially 
given Justice Scalia’s strong dissent from a denial of certiorari in a case two 
years earlier: 
Though it consists of only 28 words, the statute has been invoked to 
impose criminal penalties upon a staggeringly broad swath of 
behavior. . . . [T]his expansive phrase invites abuse by headline-
grabbing prosecutors in pursuit of local officials, state legislators, and 
corporate CEOs who engage in any manner of unappealing or 
 
 115 Id. at 5, nn.16–17 and accompanying text.   
 116 Referring to the mail and wire fraud statutes, one prosecutor noted, “[They were] our Stradivarius, 
our Colt .45, our Louisville Slugger, our Cuisinart—and our true love.” Id. at 5 (quoting Jed S. Rakoff, 
The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part I), 18 DUQ. L. REV. 771 (1980)). 
 117 McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987). 
 118 Id. (“If Congress desires to go further, it must speak more clearly than it has.”). 
 119 Harvey A. Silverglate & Monica R. Shah, The Degradation of the “Void for Vagueness” Doctrine: 
Reversing Convictions While Saving the Unfathomable “Honest Services Fraud” Statute, 2010 CATO SUP. 
CT. REV. 201, 213 (2010). 
 120 18 U.S.C.A. § 1346 (recognized as unconstitutional in 2012) (“For the purposes of [mail and wire 
fraud], the term ‘scheme or artifice to defraud’ includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the 
intangible right of honest services.”). 
 121 See Cava & Stewart, supra note 114, at 7–9 (discussing how the different federal circuit courts 
interpreted Section 1346 prior to Skilling). 
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ethically questionable conduct.122 
Unwilling to find the entire statute unconstitutional, the Court simply 
limited it to criminalize only the tangible conduct of paying bribes or 
receiving kickbacks for both public and private actors.123 Consequently, 
although there is no doubt that Skilling engaged in all manner of deceptive 
behavior during his tenure at Enron, “the Court found no evidence that he 
personally engaged in bribery or received kickbacks as part of his business 
dealings.”124  In June of 2013, a federal district court judge approved a deal 
where Skilling agreed to forfeit fourteen million dollars and to end his 
ongoing appeals in exchange for the government’s approval of a fourteen-
year sentence to include the six already served, rather than the twenty-four-
year term he was to serve.125 
 2.  Bribery and Public Corruption 
The required focus on specific personal misconduct outlined by the 
Supreme Court in Skilling possibly provides a parallel when considering the 
“value” involved in hiring an educated, skilled scion of a powerful family in 
a developing nation. No doubt enforcement actions in the domestic 
environment of corruption became so expansive that the Supreme Court 
found it necessary to set much more concrete limits on the notion of “honest 
services.” We wonder: Is the prosecutorial climate of the FCPA becoming 
equally broad? Is it possible to argue that the paucity of judicial scrutiny of 
government enforcement actions under the FCPA has set up a shadowy 
constitutional conundrum rooted in vagueness? The recent decision by the 
Seventh Circuit overturning some of the convictions offers a platform to 
make a parallel argument in the princelings problem. 
 a.  United States v. Blagojevich and Political Favors 
In 2011, Rod Blagojevich, the former Governor of Illinois, was 
convicted on federal corruption charges for his attempts to sell or trade a 
 
 122 Sorich v. United States, 555 U.S. 1308, 1309–10 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of cert.). 
 123 Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2931–33 (2011). Some commentators note that requiring 
such tangible evidence hampers the government’s ability to prosecute corruption. Cava & Stewart, supra 
note 114 at 21 (“The events of the past decade have made glaringly clear that the civil justice and 
administrative regulatory systems cannot effectively harness the imaginations of determined fraudsters.”). 
 124 Cava & Stewart, supra note 114, at 3.  
 125 Laurel Brubaker Calkins, Enron’s Skilling to Leave Prison in 2017 as Sentence Cut, 
BLOOMBERGBUSINESS (June 22, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-06-21/enron-s-
skilling-sentence-reduced-to-14-years-by-judge.  
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vacant seat on the U.S. Senate.126 He was sentenced to fourteen years in 
prison.127 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit upheld the former Governor’s 
conviction for corruption, finding his argument that there was insufficient 
evidence to be “frivolous.”128 Nonetheless, the court dismissed five of the 
seventeen counts on the grounds that they were based on a single jury 
instruction regarding three different proposals that were, in the court’s view, 
substantively different.129 
Two of the proposals in the instruction described legally corrupt 
behavior: (1) Blagojevich’s offer to appoint Valerie Jarrett to the Senate seat 
vacated by the newly elected President Barack Obama in exchange for the 
President facilitating a private sector job and (2) his request for funds he 
could control as the CEO of a new nonprofit.130 But the court saw the third 
proposal, a request to be appointed to the new President’s Cabinet, as legally 
different: “a proposal to trade one public act for another, a form of logrolling, 
is fundamentally unlike the swap of an official act for a private payment.”131 
In its further discussion of this distinction, the court offers some 
examples. 
[Extortion involves] a quid pro quo: a public official performs an 
official act (or promises to do so) in exchange for a private benefit, 
such as money. A political logroll, by contrast, is the swap of one 
official act for another.  Representative A agrees with Representative 
B to vote for milk price supports, if B agrees to vote for tighter controls 
on air pollution.  A President appoints C as an ambassador, which 
Senator D asked the President to do, in exchange for D’s promise to 
vote to confirm E as a member of the National Labor Relations Board. 
Governance would hardly be possible without these accommodations, 
which allow each public official to achieve more than his principal 
objective while surrendering something about which he cares less, but 
the other politician cares more strongly. . . . It would be more than a 
little surprising to Members of Congress if the judiciary found in the 
Hobbs Act, or the mail fraud statute, a rule making everyday politics 
criminal.132 
The opinion examines the three statutes under which Blagojevich was 
 
 126 See Monica Davey, Blagojevich Sentenced to 14 Years in Prison, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/08/us/blagojevich-expresses-remorse-in-courtroom-speech.html. The 
seat became vacant when President Obama moved from the Senate to the Presidency. Id.  
 127 Id.  
 128 United States v. Blagojevich, 794 F.3d 729, 734 (7th Cir. 2015), petition for cert. filed (Nov. 17, 
2015) (No. 15-664).  
 129 Id. at 734–35. 
 130 Id. at 733. 
 131 Id. at 734. 
 132 Id. at 735 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).  
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convicted and discusses the possibility of permissible, if perhaps unsavory, 
“political horse-trading” that attaches to each.133 It specifically excludes such 
dealings from the reach of the honest services statute after Skilling, noting 
that a public official appointing someone to a public commission as a political 
favor while saying that the appointee is “the best person for the job” is simply 
not a criminal fraud.134 
One must note here that the honest services statute applies not only to 
public officials, but also to private actors who deprive their employers of their 
honest services by taking bribes or kickbacks.135 A close analysis of the 
princeling situation does not immediately reveal any personal gain for the 
individuals who are offering the internship or the employment opportunity to 
a qualified family member of a public official abroad. While the princeling 
may not be “the best person for the job,” it is not necessarily proper to 
criminalize such decision-making without proof of the improper result of 
obtaining or retaining business under the FCPA. While one might think 
certain people are really buying influence and access in a manner that may 
seem unfair or wrong, a vague and imprecise law—one that sweeps too 
 
 133 Two other cases involve criminality of public officials in another context. Two recent trials 
illustrate the endemic and widespread corruption in our political system. In December 2015, former New 
York Senate Majority Leader Dean Skelos and his son were convicted of bribery, extortion, and 
conspiracy. Shortly before, New York Assembly Speaker Sheldon Silver was convicted for accepting 
bribes and kickbacks of over four million dollars. Yet the line between improper and acceptable behavior 
can be confusing. These public officials were convicted of illegal activity, yet it is currently legal for state 
contractors to donate to Super PACs of governors running for President with whom they have contracts. 
New York is not alone in facing these problems, but states have chosen different approaches to rooting 
out corruption. These convictions will no doubt be appealed, but the connection between the repetitious 
extraction of money over and over in large amounts from members of the private sector with business 
before the legislature will likely be sufficient to sustain the verdict. While the quid pro quo may not have 
been explicit, it was well understood by the parties and supported by the evidence. See William K. 
Rashbaum & Susanne Craig, Dean Skelos, Ex-New York Senate Leader, and His Son are Convicted of 
Corruption, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/12/nyregion/dean-skelos-
adam-skelos-guilty-corruption-trial.html?_r=0; Benjamin Weiser & Susanne Craig, Sheldon Silver, Ex-
New York Assembly Speaker, is Found Guilty on All Counts, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/01/nyregion/sheldon-silver-guilty-corruption-trial.html; Heather 
Haddon & Rebecca Ballhaus, State Contractors Aid Governors’ Campaigns, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 25, 2015), 
http://www.wsj.com/article_email/state-contractors-aid-governors-campaigns-1440547616-
IMyQjAxMTlMyQjAxMTl1NDA5MjYwNzl2Wj. For information on how each state approaches this 
problem of dealing with corruption, the Center for the Advancement of Public Integrity at Columbia Law 
School maintains an interactive map and information detailing specific initiatives in each state. See U.S. 
Anti-Corruption Oversight: A State-by-State Survey, COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL, 
http://web.law.columbia.edu/capi-map (last visited Dec. 19, 2016). 
 134 794 F.3d at 736. 
 135 See Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2934 n.46 (2011) (“Overlap with other federal 
statutes does not render § 1346 superfluous. The principal federal bribery statute, § 201, for example, 
generally applies only to federal public officials, so § 1346’s application to state and local corruption and 
to private-sector fraud reaches misconduct that might otherwise go unpunished.”) (emphasis added). 
EARLE & CAVA (DO NOT DELETE)  3/6/2017  6:20 PM 
Princelings and Banks 
37:107 (2017) 
131 
broadly, penalizing talented individuals who happen to be related to public 
officials—is not the answer. 
The Supreme Court denied Certiorari and Blagojevich was resentenced 
based on the surviving convictions. However, Judge Zabel reaffirmed the 
fourteen-year sentence.136 The prosecutor noted that Blogojevich had not 
acknowledged his wrongdoing nor was he rehabilitated.137 
 b.  Boston Probation Scandal: John O’Brien and Political Favors 
John O’Brien, the politically well-connected head of the Boston 
Probation Department, ran an agency that depended on the Massachusetts 
legislature for funding. A long and interesting history characterized the 
relationship between the legislature, the judiciary138—also dependent on 
funding from the legislature—and the Probation Department. 
O’Brien and two codefendants, Elizabeth Tavares and William Burke—
both high-level administrators in the Department—were indicted on mail 
fraud, racketeering, and violations of a gratuity statute.139 Prosecutors alleged 
that a fraudulent hiring scheme took place between 2000 and 2010.140 After 
deliberating for seven days, the jury convicted these defendants on charges 
of racketeering, conspiracy, and four counts of mail fraud.  It found they not 
only abused their positions to engage in improper hiring practices, but also 
created “a fraudulent system to make it look as though they were following 
proper hiring protocol.”141 O’Brien was sentenced to eighteen months in 
prison and fined $25,000.142 Tavares was sentenced to three months in jail.143 
Burke received probation for one year.144 
At the sentencing proceedings, the defense reiterated the concept of 
 
 136 Jason Meisner & Patrick M. O’Connell, Blagojevich Faces 8 Years More in Prison After Judge 
Sticks to 14-Year Term, CHIC. TRIB. (Aug. 9, 2016), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-rod-
blagojevich-appeal-20160809-story.html.   
 137 Id. 
 138 Boston Globe Spotlight Team, Patronage in the Probation Department, 
http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/specials/spotlight/probation/index/ (last visited Dec. 
19, 2016). 
 139 Milton J. Valencia, 3 Guilty in Probation Corruption Case, BOS. GLOBE (July 24, 2014), 
http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2014/07/24/jurors-deliberating-for-seventh-day-corruption-trial-
probation-chief-john-brien/GVxm7KQARiid2cxFyKxuXP/story.html. 
 140 Indictment, United States v. O’Brien, No. 4:12-cr-40026-FDS (D. Mass. Mar. 22, 2012); see also 
Andrea Estes & Scott Allen, 17 Bribery Counts for Ex-Head of Probation O’Brien, BOS. GLOBE (Apr. 25, 
2013), http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2013/04/24/probation/z2EzpQvta5FFjHiAurElTP/story.html.   
 141 Milton J. Valencia, Ex-Probation Chief Sentenced as System Decried, BOS. GLOBE (Nov. 13, 
2014), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2014/11/13/brien-sentenced-months/uHeOQXxxGcZN5p 
89BPySzJ/story.html. 
 142 Id. 
 143 Id. 
 144 Id. 
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permissible decision-making in the political environment: “As the district 
court had instructed the jury, Patronage, defined as ‘getting a job or a 
promotion or a government benefit based upon who you know rather than 
what you know,’ is not a crime.”145 But the trial court did not bite.  At the 
sentencing hearing, Judge Young stated: 
[P]atronage corrupts. Whether it is rendered illegal or not is 
immaterial, it corrupts. It’s dysfunctional. . . . This trial establishes, as 
no other process could, that a judiciary staff position is a thing of value 
under the laws of the Commonwealth, and any—not that it’s illegal to 
make suggestions by powerful legislators, by the Governor, it’s not 
improper to make suggestions of qualified people for employment on 
judiciary staff, but if that suggestion comes with any strings attached, 
now, today, it will be recognized as solicitation of a bribe.146 
In a noteworthy post-Blagojevich decision, the First Circuit Court of 
Appeals stayed the two jail sentences pending appeal, finding “sufficient 
probability that the appeals present a substantial question.”147 Following the 
analysis outlined in Blagojevich, O’Brien’s counsel argued in their brief: 
The government did not allege that O’Brien or his co-defendants 
received any money for hiring any particular individual . . . The 
government essentially alleged that O’Brien participated in a political 
patronage, which the district court instructed the jury is not a 
crime. . . .148 
O’Brien was not alleged to have received personal monetary reward for 
his actions and was not accused of hiring unqualified individuals. However, 
his department’s budget was augmented to the point that he was able to 
provide employment for friends and children of friends.  In his brief, O’Brien 
argued: 
[T]his Court should reject the government’s effort to transform 
political patronage, which, as the court below instructed, is not a 
crime, into federal racketeering and mail fraud particularly where, as 
here, there was no allegation that unqualified persons were hired, no 
allegation that any defendant sought personal benefit, and the purpose 
of the allegedly fraudulent scheme was to protect or enhance Probation 
 
 145 Motion for Release Pending Appeal and Supporting Memorandum, United States v. O’Brien, No. 
14-2314 (1st Cir. Dec. 22, 2014) (quoting Jury instruction p.24 (Attachment C, p.4)). 
 146 Id. at 165 (This is page 78 of Attachment B, the hearing transcript). 
 147 U.S. v. O’Brien, No. 14-2312, No. 14-2313 (1st Cir. Jan. 9, 2015). 
 148 Brief for Defendant/Appellant at 3, United States v. O’Brien, No. 14-2314 (1st Cir. Jan. 27, 2016). 
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The O’Brien defense further argued: 
[T]he gratuity statute (M.G.L. c.268A §3(a)) required the government 
to prove a linkage between something of substantial value given to an 
official and a particular official act. That the official was in a position 
to take some action that could benefit the giver or that something was 
given to build a reservoir of goodwill that might affect some future 
unspecified act is not enough. . . .150 
At most, the evidence suggested that O’Brien took the alleged actions 
“by reason of the recipient’s mere tenure in office” or “to build a 
reservoir of goodwill that might ultimately affect one or more of a 
multitude of unspecified acts, now and in the future.”151 
Will the First Circuit agree with the Seventh Circuit that such behavior 
is “logrolling” and reverse the conviction? Or will it agree with Judge Young 
that, even though there was no personal benefit to O’Brien and his actions 
“protected” the probation department’s budget, this behavior is not legal but 
rather “corrupt, a sham, and dysfunctional?”152 The O’Brien case was argued 
on appeal before the 1st Circuit in July and a decision is pending.153 
 c.  McDonnell and Quid Pro Quo 
Virginia’s previous governor, Robert McDonnell,154 was indicted along 
with his wife for activities with a businessman, Jonnie Williams, who had 
hoped to do business with the state.155 They were charged with honest 
services fraud156 and Hobbs Act violations for accepting loans and gifts from 
 
 149 Id. at 24. 
 150 Id. at 65. 
 151 Id. at 66 (emphasis added) (quoting Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 408 (1999)). 
 152 Honorable Judge William G. Young, Judge’s Findings, United States v. O’Brien. No. 14-2314 (1st 
Cir. Jan, 27, 2016) app. at 6–7. 
 153 Shelley Murphy, Court Queries Legal Teams in Appeal of Probation Case, BOS. GLOBE (July 25, 
2016), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2016/07/25/federal-appeals-court-hears-arguments-
probation-department-scandal-case/5IEPGYNnlfZ511dOnyktEK/story.html. 
 154 Robert McDonnell, NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N, https://www.nga.org/cms/home/governors/past-
governors-bios/page_virginia/col2-content/main-content-list/robert-mcdonnell.default.html (last visited 
Oct. 3, 2016). 
 155 See Rosalind S. Helderman et al., Former Va. Gov. McDonnell and Wife Charged in Gifts Case, 
WASH. POST (Jan. 21, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-politics/former-va-gov-
mcdonnell-and-wife-charged-in-gifts-case/2014/01/21/1ed704d2-82cb-11e3-9dd4-
e7278db80d86_story.html.  
 156 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2012) (“For the purposes of this chapter, the term ‘scheme or artifice to defraud’ 
includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services.”). Section 1346 
works in conjunction with 18 U.S.C. § 1341 and 18 U.S.C. § 1343, which prohibit the use of mail, TV, 
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Williams. Williams was hoping to secure public universities’ cooperation in 
promoting his company manufactured dietary supplement by conducting 
studies with favorable outcomes, which would help boost sales.157 The jury 
in the District Court trial convicted them both on most counts,158 and the 
Fourth Circuit affirmed.159 On Certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, 
the Court vacated and remanded and issued a unanimous opinion.160 The 
ruling was thus very significant and interpreted what was an “official act” 
under the statute.161 The Court rejected the challenge that the Hobbs Act and 
honest services fraud statutes were unconstitutionally vague.162 The 
Department of Justice filed with the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
“[a]fter carefully considering the Supreme Court’s recent decision and the 
principles of federal prosecution, we have made the decision not to pursue 
the case further.”163 They also chose not retry Maureen McDonnell. 
McDonnell and his wife were accused and initially convicted of 
accepting $175,000 from Williams.164 The government “to convict . . . was 
required to show that Governor McDonnell committed (or agreed to commit) 
an ‘official act’ in exchange for loans and gifts.”165  The gifts and loans were 
emblematic of a couple living beyond their means—including $20,000 in 
designer clothes, a $15,000 wedding gift for the Governor’s daughter, a 
$50,000 loan and free flights on a private plane.166 The issue was what 
constituted an “official act?” The prosecutor had argued that there were at 
least five official acts whereas the Governor had argued that “merely setting 
up a meeting, hosting an event or contacting an official—without more—
does not count as an ‘official act.’”167 At the inception, 
 
radio, or wire services—including the internet—for the purpose of executing “any scheme or artifice to 
defraud.” 
 157 See United States v. McDonnell, 792 F.3d 478, 487–93 (4th Cir. 2015). 
 158 Id. at 493–94; see also Verdicts in the McDonnell Trial, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH (Sept. 4, 
2014), http://www.richmond.com/news/state-regional/virginia-politics/verdicts-in-the-mcdonnell-trial/ 
article_9e1b84d2-3385-11e4-9388-0017a43b2370.html; Frank Green et al., Bob and Maureen McDonnell 
Convicted in Historic Corruption Trial, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH (Sept. 4, 2014), 
http://www.richmond.com/news/state-regional/virginia-politics/bob-mcdonnell-convicted-on-of-counts-
maureen-mcdonnell-on-of/article_7b9b6118-343c-11e4-bef2-001a4bcf6878.html.  
 159 McDonnell, 792 F.3d at 520. 
 160 McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016).  
 161 Id. at 2367–75. 
 162 Id.at 2375. 
 163 Alan Blinder, U.S. Ends Corruption Case Against Former Virginia Governor, N. Y. TIMES (Sept. 
8, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/09/us-ends-corruption-case-against-former-virginia-
governor.html. 
 164 McDonnell, 136 S.Ct. at 2357. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Id.at 2362–63; United States v. McDonnell, 792 F.3d 478, 487–89 (4th Cir. 2015). 
 167 McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2365–66. 
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[t]he parties agreed that they would define honest services fraud with 
reference to the federal bribery statute, 18 U.S.C § 201. That statute 
makes it a crime for “a public official or person selected to be a public 
official, directly or indirectly, corruptly” to demand, seek, receive, 
accept, or agree, “to receive or accept anything of value” in return for 
“being influenced in the performance of any official act” 
. . . 
The parties also agreed that obtaining a “thing of value . . . knowing 
that the thing of value was given in return for official action” was an 
element of Hobbs Act extortion. 
. . . 
[F]ulfillment of the quid pro quo is not an element of the offense.168 
Both the Governor and his wife took the stand during the trial and were 
convicted on all counts except for the false statements.169 Despite the 
prosecution’s arguments for longer sentences, the Governor was sentenced 
to two years and his wife to one.170 
The Supreme Court framed the issue as an inquiry into the meaning of 
“official act.” It unanimously rejected the government’s position, deciding 
instead to “adopt a more bounded interpretation of ‘official act.’”171 The 
Court noted that under the more constrained view, “setting up a meeting, 
calling another public official, or hosting an event does not, standing alone, 
qualify as an ‘official act.’”172 
The Court noted that the Government’s argument raised constitutional 
problems.173 
Section 201 prohibits quid pro quo corruption—the exchange of a 
thing of value for an “official act.” In the Government’s view, nearly 
anything a public official accepts—from a campaign contribution to 
lunch—counts as a quid; and nearly anything a public official does—
from arranging a meeting to inviting a guest to an event—counts as a 
quo.174 
Support for the defense’s position came from both Democrats and 
Republicans warning that the “breathtaking expansion of public corruption 
law would likely chill federal officials’ interactions with the people they 
 
 168 Id. at 2366. 
 169 See Green et al., supra note 158.  
 170 See Jennifer Steinhauer, Bob McDonell, Ex-Governor of Virginia, is Sentenced to 2 Years for 
Corruption, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/07/us/bob-mcdonnell-ex-
governor-virginia-sentencing-corruption.html.  
 171 McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2367. 
 172 Id. at 2367–68. 
 173 Id. at 2372. 
 174 Id. 
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serve and thus damage their ability to effectively perform their duties.”175 
The Court remanded for the lower court to determine if there was 
sufficient evidence under the new standard to determine if there was an 
official act, but the DOJ decided to drop the case. The Court did note: 
There is no doubt that this case is distasteful; it may be worse than 
that. But our concern is not with tawdry tales of Ferraris, Rolexes, and 
ball gowns. It is instead with the broader legal implications and the 
Government’s boundless interpretation of the federal bribery statute. 
A more limited interpretation of the term official act leaves ample 
room for prosecuting corruption, while comporting with the text of the 
statute and the precedent of this court.176 
How will this unanimous ruling affect FCPA cases if at all?  Bill 
Steinman in the FCPA Blog argues that it will not have a dramatic effect: 
The short answer to these questions is no, and the explanation is a 
simple one. While both statutes prohibit offering, giving or promising 
something of value to an official to influence official acts, the FCPA 
contains an additional restriction that is absent from 18 USC 201 
(sic)(federal bribery statute). In particular the FCPA makes it a crime 
to offer, give or promise anything of value to a foreign official to 
induce the official “to use his influence with a foreign government or 
instrumentality thereof to affect or influence any act or decision of 
such government instrumentality.” 
. . . 
But companies must bear in mind that the FCPA, on its face, is broader 
than its domestic sibling. It specifically reaches conduct- paying 
officials for the purpose of inducing then to use their influence with 
other officials that is not addressed in 18 USC 201. So the Supreme 
Court’s ruling doesn’t significantly change the FCPA landscape.177 
Nonetheless, the unanimous Supreme Court opinion suggests that an 
expansive reading over-criminalizing business conduct will not be favored 
and could serve to curtail some overzealous prosecutions. We will have to 
wait to assess the impact of the ruling on prosecutors’ conduct and future 
case decisions, of which there are few in the FCPA arena.178 
 
 175 Id. 
 176 Id. at 2375. 
 177 Bill Steinman, What Does the Bob McDonnell Ruling Mean for the FCPA?, FCPA BLOG (June 29, 
2016, 9:18 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2016/6/29/bill-steinman-what-does-the-bob-mcdonnell-
ruling-mean-for-th.html.  
 178 For further discussion on how the McDonnell case might apply to the FCPA, see id. (“Gov. 
McDonnell had been convicted under the federal bribery statute, 18 USC 201, which contains similar 
language to the FCPA.  Indeed, in some respects, the two laws are virtual twins. So what does the SCOTUS 
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 3.  Commercial Bribery: Pay to Play 
Pay to play or “payola” scandals rocked the radio stations within the 
United States in the 1950s and 60s179 and have not ended.180 Most recently, 
the largest distributor of craft beers in Massachusetts, Craft Brewers Guild, 
has been given a ninety-day suspension from business because it paid 
$120,000 over five years to different bars to carry only their beers and not 
others.181 Although Craft Brewers may opt to pay a fine and continue to 
distribute beer, the amount would be equal to half of its profits during a 
ninety-day period. While it is legal to pay for shelf space in supermarkets and 
other businesses, many states forbid doing so for sales of alcohol.182 The bars 
involved were also charged for having accepted payments, but at least one 
 
decision mean for the FCPA?  Not terribly much.”); Richard L. Cassin, Supremes Toss McDonnell 
Conviction, Knock DOJ’s ‘Boundless Interpretation’ Of Federal Bribery Law, FCPA BLOG (June 27, 
2016, 11:28 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2016/6/27/supremes-toss-mcdonnell-conviction-
knock-dojs-boundless-inte.html; Tom Fox, McDonnell and FCPA Enforcement, COMPLIANCE & ETHICS 
BLOG (June 18, 2016), http://complianceandethics.org/mcdonnell-fcpa-enforcement; Dylan Tokar, The 
Implications of the Supreme Court’s McDonnell Ruling for the FCPA, JUST ANTI-CORRUPTION: GLOBAL 
INVESTIGATIONS REV. (June 28, 2016), 
https://www.dechert.com/files/Uploads/Documents/The_implications_of_the_Supreme_Court_McDonn
ell_ruling_for_the_FCPA_-_Dechert_-_28062016.pdf (“[T]he McDonnell ruling on Monday set a high 
bar for proving an official act under the federal bribery statute.  The Supreme Court’s decision could in 
turn provide leverage for defence lawyers to push back against expansive government theories in FCPA 
cases.”); Michael Volkov, The FCPA Implications of the Supreme Court’s McDonnell Decision—A 
Mountain Out of a Molehill?, CORRUPTION, CRIME & COMPLIANCE BLOG (July 14, 2016), 
http://blog.volkovlaw.com/2016/07/fcpa-implications-supreme-courts-mcdonnell-decision-mountain-
molehill (“Taking the McDonnell facts and putting them into a foreign government official’s context, the 
bribe giver, and not the taker (e.g. Governor McDonnell) would have violated the FCPA because he would 
have given the gifts with the intent to ‘affect or influence’ any act or decision of the foreign government.”); 
Ctr. for Advancement of Pub. Integrity, The McDonnell Supreme Court Case: What Comes Next? (June 
30, 2016), http://web.law.columbia.edu/public-integrity/our-work/what-comes-next/what-comes-next-
mcdonnell-supreme-court-case; Allison C. Davis, Presupposing Corruption: Access, Influence, and the 
Future of the Pay-to-Play Legal Framework, 7 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 197, 210–11 (2016) (“The 
government only has a compelling interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption or the appearance 
thereof—rather than the presupposition of corruption—via restrictions of contributions, and ‘access’ 
resulting from contributions or expenditures does not constitute corruption.”). 
 179  Lydia Hutchinson, Alan Freed and the Radio Payola Scandal, PERFORMING SONGWRITER (Aug. 
20, 2015), http://performingsongwriter.com/alan-freed-payola-scandal/ (discussing the history of how 
radio stations operated). 
 180 Groups or individuals can still pay money to have matter broadcast on the radio, but the station 
must disclose the payment. 47 U.S.C. § 317 (2012). 
 181 Dan Adams & Megan Woolhouse, Putting Penalties on Tap, BOS. GLOBE (Feb. 13, 2016) at A1 
(discussing the practice and contrasting with other stores where the practice is legal). 
 182 Id.; cf. Dan Adams, Bar Owner Who Admitted Taking Incentives Won’t Face Penalty, BOS. GLOBE 
(July 29, 2016) https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2016/07/29/regulators-decline-punish-bar-owner-
who-admitted-taking-bribes/tymipoMRngE3fZNnJpGr8H/story.html (discussing how Craft Brewers paid 
a $2.6 million fine and challenged the ruling in Court). 
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bar owner was not sanctioned and other cases are pending.183 
While pay-to-play cases are not directly analogous to the princelings 
problem, they underscore the rough business environment that allows the 
practice in some arenas such as supermarkets. It is confusing that this trading 
of favors and money is legal in some contexts and not in others. Furthermore, 
domestically the hiring of offspring of well-connected people from both 
public and private sectors has long been a fact of life. While in this case, the 
ban on pay-to-play with alcohol allows smaller breweries to have access to a 
market that otherwise might be closed off by the powerful larger breweries. 
In the bar cases, relatively large sums of money changed hands, whereas in 
the princelings situations there were not large sums of money and arguably 
no money. Is the hiring of princelings more akin to logrolling, with no 
identifiable quid pro quo? 
 4.  Insider Trading – United States v. Newman and United States v. 
Salman 
The insider trading cases present an apt analogy to the princeling cases. 
The government has been trying—with some success—to prosecute these 
cases because it appears wrongful to let insiders benefit in a way from trading 
with information that the public never had a chance to access. To put it in the 
vernacular, it smelled, and the prosecutors were trying desperately to corral 
these Wall Street practices.184 Similarly, the government is alleging that the 
banks’ hiring of “sons and daughters” is tainted and evidence of corruption. 
Todd Newman and Chiasson were employed by different hedge 
funds.185 They were both indicted and convicted of securities fraud for 
receiving tips indirectly from insiders at Dell and Nividia.186 They were three 
levels removed from the original Dell insider and four levels removed from 
the Nividia insider.187 The Second Circuit overturned the convictions, stating 
that the prosecution must show “a meaningfully close personal relationship 
 
 183 Dan Adams, Bar Owner Who Admitted Taking Incentives Won’t Face Penalty, BOS. GLOBE (July 
29, 2016), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2016/07/29/regulators-decline-punish-bar-owner-
who-admitted-taking-bribes/tymipoMRngE3fZNnJpGr8H/story.html (discussing the lack of evidence 
linking payments to specific tap lines in a specific bar). 
 184Avi Weitzman & Daniel P. Chung, United States v. Newman: Second Circuit Ruling Portends 
Choppier Waters for Insider Trading Charges Against Downstream Tippees, GIBSON DUNN (Dec. 15, 
2014), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/US-v-Newman—Second-Circuit-Ruling-
Portends-Choppier-Waters—Insider-Trading-Charges-Against-Downstream-Tippees.pdf. 
 185 United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 442 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 242 (Mem.) 
(2015). 
 186 Id. at 442–43. 
 187 Id. at 443. 
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that generates an exchange that is objective, consequential, and represents at 
least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature.”188 The 
Supreme Court denied certiorari in October 2015.189 
However, in January 2016, the Supreme Court agreed to review a Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals insider trading case, United States v. Salman.190 No 
doubt the Court will examine its 1983 statement in Dirks v. SEC.: “the test is 
whether the insider personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his 
disclosure.”191 “That benefit can be tangible, like money or services, or ‘when 
an insider makes a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or 
friend.’”192 
Arguably, the facts are stronger for the prosecution in this case than in 
the Newman or Chiasson cases. An individual at Citigroup, Maher Kara, gave 
information to his brother, Michael, who passed the information onto Bassam 
Salman, whose sister was engaged to marry Maher. Salman made a profit of 
$1.7 million. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit upheld the conviction, declining 
to follow the Second Circuit’s opinion and finding the Dirks test was met. 
The judge, who incidentally was from Southern District of New York and 
sitting by designation, noted that the evidence was adequate and that 
otherwise “a corporate insider or other person in possession of confidential 
and proprietary information would be free to disclose that information to her 
relatives, and they would be free to trade on it, provided only that she asked 
for no tangible compensation in return.”193 This result would surely subvert 
the purpose of the law. 
The case was argued October 5, 2016 and a ruling is expected by June 
2017.194 If the Court upholds Salman’s conviction, it will push back the more 
restrictive necessity of finding a quid pro quo.195 
 
 188 Id. at 452; see also Peter J. Henning, An Insider Trading Case Heads to the Supreme Court, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 20, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/21/business/dealbook/an-insider-trading-case-
heads-to-the-supreme-court.html?_r=0 (discussing how that phrase “drew the ire of the Justice 
Department”).  
 189 United States v. Newman, 136 S. Ct. 242 (Mem.) (2015). 
 190 United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted in part, 136 S. Ct. 899 
(Mem.) (2016).  
 191 Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662 (1983). 
 192 Henning, supra note 188.   
 193 Salman, 792 F.3d. at 1094. 
 194 See Ben Protess & Matthew Goldstein, What is a ‘Personal Benefit’ from Insider Trading? Justices 
Hear Arguments, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/06/business/ 
dealbook/supreme-court-insider-trading.html (discussing oral argument noting that the most vigorous 
critic of judge made law, Antonin Scalia, is now deceased). 
 195 But see Bob Egelko, How Scalia’s Death Impacts Supreme Court’s Pending Cases, Future, S.F. 
CHRON. (Feb. 14, 2016, 6:27 PM), http://www.sfchronicle.com/nation/article/How-Scalia-s-death-
impacts-Supreme-Court-s-6830637.php. 
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 C.  University “Legacy” Admissions 
The admissions policies of private universities have been regarded as in 
the private domain unless they violate federal or state discrimination law.196 
Harvard University’s admissions policy was lauded in the famous Bakke case 
as an example of the permissible flexibility accorded to private 
universities.197 Race, musical ability, and descendants of alumni were 
accorded plusses in admissions calculations.198 Public universities have been 
more restricted by law in recent cases.199 Yet legacy admissions policies skirt 
the issue of whether alumni are paying for advantage for their offspring in a 
way similar to the pay to play in commercial bribery. 
For example, Duke University woos “development admits”—both 
alumni children and children of wealthy potential donors who might be 
interested in sending their children to Duke.200 Making no apologies, Duke’s 
Director of Development Communications, Peter Vaughn, denied any 
impropriety: “There’s no quid pro quo, no bargains have been struck.”201 
Duke acknowledged admitting 100–125 students through a special program, 
accounting for almost 5% of student body.202 Further, the university noted 
that its fundraising during a six-year period surpassed the efforts of all 
universities; accordingly, the data shows their admission program achieved 
its objective.203 
While there is no explicit required donation to get your child admitted, 
parents seem to understand that there is a mutually beneficial exchange. 
Nothing better illustrates this than an email exchange uncovered as result of 
WikiLeaks and Sony hacks.204 Deborah Freidell of the London Review of 
Books Blog reposted this correspondence: 
WikiLeaks has published all the Sony emails that had been hacked last 
November, and made them searchable by keyword. In 2014, a senior 
 
 196See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 316–17, 321–23 (1978) 
(discussing Harvard University). 
 197 Id. 
 198 Id. 
 199 See generally Alexandra Raphel, Affirmative Action in University Admissions: Research Roundup, 
JOURNALIST’S RESOURCE (Dec. 9, 2015), http://journalistsresource.org/studies/society/race-
society/affirmative-action-in-university-admissions-research-roundup. 
 200 See Daniel Golden, Many Colleges Bend Rules to Admit Rich Applicants, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 20, 
2003), http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/Polk_Rich_Applicants.htm. 
 201 Id.  
 202 Id. 
 203 Id. 
 204 See generally WIKILEAKS, https://wikileaks.org/ (containing history and material for the so called 
WikiLeaks). 
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executive emailed an Ivy League vice-president of philanthropy: he’d 
like to endow a scholarship, anonymously, ‘at the $1mm level’. In 
another email, he tells a development officer that his daughter is 
applying to the college as her first choice. It’s all very decorous. The 
development staff arrange a ‘customised’ campus tour for his daughter 
and a meeting with the university’s president; but he asks for no 
favours and nothing is promised.205 
After his daughter was admitted, the same Sony executive wrote to his 
sister: “David. . . called me. he [sic] is obsessed with getting his eldest in 
Harvard next year.” She replied, “If David wants to get his daughter in he 
should obviously start giving money.”206 Reportedly, legacies get into 
Harvard at five times the rate of nonlegacies.207 
In the world of legacy admissions, the quid pro quo is not often made 
explicit.  Rather, it is more or less understood, a calculated decision that 
might yield rewards in time. Is this illegal?  Should it be?  And how different 
is this acceptable scenario from the one under examination here, hiring well-
connected people? 
Internationally, this issue of corruption of admissions takes an 
interesting turn. Corruption in education can exclude gifted students from 
coveted opportunities while well-connected, less talented students gain 
access to them. A classic example is the plight of an Egyptian student who 
took an exam for medical school and received a zero on all seven parts; it 
seemed she had not answered a single question. In reality, this student’s 
excellent scores had been hijacked by someone who had left the exam blank, 
but who had access to a rigged system.208 
Most recently, a Chinese administrator at a university admitted 
accepting $3.6 million in bribes between 2006 and 2013. This is different 
from the system in U.S. universities, where money goes to the school rather 
than to an individual admissions officer (at least as far as reported). A 
commentator who lives in China and works in education has suggested that 
the movement to broaden the criteria for admission to Chinese universities 
beyond just a test score has opened the door to more discretionary admits, 
which in turn allows more favoritism and corruption.209 Ironically, change 
 
 205 Deborah Friedell, How to Get into Harvard, LRB BLOG (Apr. 20, 2015), http://www.lrb.co.uk/ 
blog/2015/04/20/deborah-friedell/how-to-get-into-harvard.   
 206 Id. 
 207 Id.; Jia Tolentino, How to Decorously Buy Your Daughter’s Way into Harvard, JEZEBEL (Apr. 21, 
2015, 2:50 PM), http://jezebel.com/how-to-decorously-buy-your-daughters-way-into-harvard-
1699199316.  
 208 Carol Matlack, Buying a Diploma Is Easy If You Can Pay Up, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 
1, 2015, 5:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-01/buying-a-diploma-is-easy-if-
you-can-pay-up (discussing multiple instances of corruption in education and its impact on society). 
 209 Michael Forsythe, China Bribes Cast Doubt on College Admissions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2015, at 
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designed to broaden admissions criteria backfired into a way to allow the 
privileged few to rig the process in their favor.210 Here, gifting that is an 
implied quid pro quo for admissions to a competitive university has not been 
declared illegal. It is one of those tawdry practices that is unavailable to most 
who lack the resources but nonetheless a common practice that makes one 
uncomfortable. 
 D.  Supreme Court Discussion of Corruption 
There is a dilemma between reading a statute so narrowly that it escapes 
capturing real wrongdoing and enforcing it so broadly that honest people are 
ensnared in the over-criminalization of business practices. The former view 
is perhaps best captured by Justices Stevens’ dissent in Citizens United,211 in 
which he criticizes the majority’s narrow and naive view of corruption: 
Undergirding the majority’s approach to the merits is the claim that 
the only “sufficiently important government interest in preventing 
corruption or the appearance of corruption” is one that is “limited to 
quid pro quo corruption.” This is the same “crabbed view of 
corruption” espoused by Justice Kennedy in McConnell and squarely 
rejected by the Court in that case. While it is true that we have not 
always spoken about corruption in a clear or consistent voice, the 
approach taken by the majority cannot be right, in my judgment. It 
disregards our constitutional history and the fundamental demands of 
a democratic society. 
On numerous occasions we have recognized Congress’ legitimate 
interest in preventing the money that is spent on elections from 
exerting an “undue influence on an officeholder’s judgment” and from 
creating “the appearance of such influence,” beyond the sphere of quid 
pro quo relationships. Corruption can take many forms. Bribery may 
be the paradigm case. But the difference between selling a vote and 
selling access is a matter of degree, not kind. And selling access is not 
qualitatively different from giving special preference to those who 
spent money on one’s behalf. Corruption operates along a spectrum, 
and the majority’s apparent belief that quid pro quo arrangements can 
 
A16 (discussing the prosecution of one administrator at Renmin University and other examples of 
corruption and problems). 
 210 Id. 
 211 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 929 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Gabrielle 
Levy, How Citizens United Has Changed Politics in 5 Years, U.S. NEWS (Jan. 21, 2015, 12:26 PM), 
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/01/21/5-years-later-citizens-united-has-remade-us-politics 
(“In its Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission decision, the court opened the campaign 
spending floodgates. The justices’ ruling said political spending is protected under the First Amendment, 
meaning corporations and unions could spend unlimited amounts of money on political activities, as long 
as it was done independently of a party or candidate.”). 
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be neatly demarcated from other improper influences does not accord 
with the theory or reality of politics.212 
Justice Stevens called the majority focus on quid pro quo “myopic” and 
underlined the fact that the Framers “discussed corruption ‘more often in the 
Constitutional Convention than factions, violence, or instability.’”213 
In her dissenting opinion in Yates,214 Justice Elena Kagan also noted her 
concern about a worrisome trend toward over-criminalization in our legal 
system. In that case, a fisherman threw back several undersized fish after 
being stopped by the Coast Guard and was successfully prosecuted under the 
shredding provisions of Sarbanes Oxley. The government argued a fish is a 
“tangible object” under the statute. 
That brings to the surface the real issue: overcriminalization and 
excessive punishment in the U.S. Code. . . . Still and all, I tend to 
think, for the reasons the plurality gives, that § 1519 is a bad law—too 
broad and undifferentiated, with too-high maximum penalties, which 
give prosecutors too much leverage and sentencers with too much 
discretion. And I’d go further: In those ways, § 1519 is unfortunately 
not an outlier, but an emblem of a deeper pathology in the federal 
criminal code.215 
Nonetheless, Justice Kagan rejected the notion that the Court should 
rewrite the law, suggesting it would be up to Congress to do so. 
We see similarities in the current scenario involving adult children of 
powerful foreign officials, namely:  How should the FCPA be interpreted 
such that it is neither rewritten nor applied so broadly that it oversteps 
governmental or judicial authority, thereby undermining the rule of law? 
 IV.  PROPOSAL 
Within the princeling context, a deal that is conditioned on hiring X or 
Y, who is related to the foreign official, is reasonably a quid pro quo of value 
to that foreign official and therefore improper under the FCPA. We note that 
JP Morgan has already abandoned its blatantly improper “Sons and 
 
 212 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 961 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (citing McConnell v. 
FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 95 (2003)).  
 213 Id. at 963–64 (quoting Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341, 
352 (2009)). 
 214 Known as the fish shredding case, the case poses the question of whether the destruction of 
undersized fish by a fisherman was a violation of Sarbanes Oxley provision originally meant to deal with 
the shredding of documents. The decision was held for Yates by 5-4. Kagan and Scalia dissented because 
of the way the law was written even though they might not have liked the result. Yates v. United States, 
135 S. Ct. 1074, 1090 (2015) (Kagan, J., dissenting).  
 215 Id. at 1100–01. 
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Daughters” program. But it might have been successful had it looked to 
Harvard College’s admissions criteria,216 which evaluates all candidates 
fairly but allows a degree of credit for specific qualifications. Similarly, 
implementing clear hiring standards that allow some variant intangibles such 
as cultural competency due to study abroad, knowledge of the local business 
environment, particular command of a language, etc., should be sufficient to 
pass the legal hurdle. 
Making a hiring decision simply on a quid pro quo basis is wrong in all 
contexts. But a considered decision to hire an official’s son may be defensible 
on many levels.  Whether or not it constitutes an improper exchange of value 
requires examining that decision from both sides.  On the one hand, the 
business must be able to demonstrate that the hire is a legitimate exercise of 
discretion, buttressed by evidence of superior competence.  On the other 
hand, business transactions that follow the hire must appear to be unrelated 
and defensibly in the normal course of business. 
We suggest that trading favors in business does not often work like a 
direct quid pro quo. It is more akin to the scenario where A helps B and B 
gets C to help A’s son; the currency is that of helping or scratching each 
other’s back. Accordingly, it goes without saying that in the domestic context 
corporations hire sons and daughters of powerful legislators all the time.  
Congress has not yet seen fit to prohibit such decisions. Similarly, without 
evidence of an exchange of value, it may be that the government goes too far 
in interpreting the FCPA in such a blanket fashion. 
The discussion in Blagojevich illustrates the parallel legal line drawn in 
cases involving domestic public officials.217 Even countries that have very 
low corruption, such as Denmark, must deal with similar situations. One 
researcher has found that “even in environments where outright bribery and 
kickbacks are rare to nonexistent, power still pays dividends for local-level 
politicians, their families, and firms linked to them.”218 The grey area is large 
and endemic across all cultures. 
Similarly, the proper legal line in hiring progeny of public officials 
under the FCPA is unclear at best. One need only look at the thirteen Opinion 
 
 216 See generally 438 U.S. at 316–17, 321–23 (discussing Harvard’s admission program).   
 217 See supra notes 134–35 and accompanying text. 
 218 Morten Bennedsen, Denmark May Be Bribe Free, but Power Pays off for Local Pols, FCPA BLOG 
(Jan. 13, 2016, 9:28 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2016/1/13/morten-bennedsen-denmark-may-
be-bribe-free-but-power-pays-of.html (“Maybe the most remarkable pattern apparent here is that the 
income boost from power isn’t limited to the politician alone; his or her close family members—adult 
children in particular—also get a taste. In fact, the power-income connection was twice as strong on 
average for the offspring than for the politician. The effect was strongest for children who resided in the 
same municipality as their parents.”). 
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Releases where somewhat troubling entanglements were approved.219 
The DOJ needs to clarify its view of this issue so that companies may 
design and implement hiring programs to maximize their success in any 
country with confidence. Companies should not have to guess and then be 
subjected to agonizingly costly investigations if they guess wrong. We note 
that so-called “Monday morning quarterbacking” by government regulators 
is increasingly subject to comment and criticism. 
Our proposal suggests the Department of Justice and the Securities and 
Exchange Commission implement the following: 
1. Update the FCPA Guidance to reflect a best practice approach to 
this problem. In other words, clarify that “Sons and Daughters” are 
not precluded from positions, but safeguards must be in place. 
2. The government should further clarify what would be considered 
an appropriate policy regarding hiring relatives of foreign officials 
connected to present and future business dealings.  For example, 
what might overcome the present “assume a quid pro quo” attitude? 
Is it a detailed Human Resource procedure? Is it a clear standard 
for qualification? 
3. Require new hires to sign forms agreeing to refrain from dealing 
with a relative who is a foreign official on any business matter for 
the company. 
4. Companies must adopt clear and more specific hiring policies for 
both internships and permanent positions that provide their own 
guidance to out-of-country managers. Further, businesses must 
require scrupulous attention to maintaining accurate records so that 
documentation exists to verify process and outcome. 
5. Companies must pay attention to ongoing business relationships 
and establish a procedure to detect and prevent any movement of a 
permissible hire into what appears to be a possible quid pro quo 
situation. 
It is advisable to monitor judicial decisions in related areas of corruption 
involving public officials.  For example, forthcoming opinions in Salman and 
O’Brien might offer some nuggets of insight into judicial perception of 
insider misbehavior, permissible political logrolling versus improper 
patronage, and the like. Nonetheless, neither case would be controlling as 
neither involves the FCPA. 
Although it may be impossible to make it absolutely clear where the 
legal line is on hiring relatives of foreign officials, there is much room for 
improvement given the current opaque environment. 
 
 219 See supra Part III.A.  
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 V.  CONCLUSION 
Is it possible for a business to hire relatives of foreign officials? When 
is doing so legitimate relationship building and when does that strategy 
become suspect as a form of criminal corruption—i.e., bribery—under the 
FCPA? In searching for analogous situations, we see judicial acceptance of 
logrolling for appointments to public positions as a necessary element of 
politics, despite an admittedly unsavory dimension.220 We also note societal 
acceptance of an exchange of value in the form of donations to private 
universities that result in favorable admissions decisions. However 
unseemly, these are not criminal practices; we exist with these contradictions. 
We posit that business must be able to engage in legitimate relationship 
building and other promotional activities if we wish to encourage its growth. 
Surely, the FCPA can permit a middle ground between the extremes 
described above by, on the one hand, Justice Stevens, who wanted a broader 
view of corruption rather than a narrow, more limited or “crabbed view of 
corruption”221 and Justice Kagan, who was more concerned with over-
criminalization.222  The courts should not issue a ruling, nor should the DOJ 
or SEC extract a settlement, that summarily prohibits the hiring of adult 
children of foreign officials. We think it obvious that doing so would 
inappropriately affect a large number of the well-educated and 
knowledgeable younger generation, particularly in developing countries. But 
neither should a business turn a blind eye to offering a job to that same well-
educated young adult in return for a specific act. We find it equally obvious 
that doing so evidences the quid pro quo that is the hallmark of finding 
corrupt intent. 
More difficult is the offering of a job to a foreign official’s adult child 
without a specific promise extracted in return, but with the understanding that 
there may be business opportunities in the future.  Suppose that future is a 
year down the road? Two years? Would it be different if a business 
opportunity related to the adult child’s contacts materialized five years later?  
It is this situation that may gall some, but we posit that if the person is 
qualified and there is a documented process, then the adult child simply 
should be prohibited from working on a deal associated with the foreign 
official parent and should refrain from using their related contacts for a 
minimum period, whether that be for one year or even longer, similar to 
restrictions on government employees becoming lobbyists in their 
 
 220 See United States v. Blagojevich, 794 F.3d 729 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 221 See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 964 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting 
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 152 (2003)). 
 222 See Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1090 (2015) (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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Ultimately, the defining dimensions of a legitimate hire are the 
individual’s personal qualifications and relevant experience combined with 
the rigor of the process. It is not difficult to document that the individual was 
selected during a hiring process that could be defended as similar across the 
company. Of course, one may argue that there is a strong “halo effect” that 
occurs when hiring foreign officials’ offspring. The company benefits locally 
from this association, albeit indirectly with powerful local figures. This might 
be particularly true when a foreign enterprise offers salary, training, and 
development opportunities not otherwise available in the local business 
environment. That may be the case, but it is equally the case that business 
hiring is not and has never been a perfect meritocracy. We have pointed out 
that the college admission process is similarly suspect, but has never been 
attacked as overly corrupt. We can accept that the adage, “it is not always 
what you know, but who you know” as having some legitimate existence in 
every aspect of life. 
The question is, what is criminal? Or even a civil wrong? The BNY 
settlement gives some guidance of what kind of hiring process companies 
need to have to protect from liability. If JP Morgan refuses to settle and 
proceeds to trial, we might have definitive contours of what is a criminal 
behavior, at least according to a federal district court. If they choose not to 
litigate, then any settlement will offer minimal guidance at the least and if 
detailed, then could assist companies in designing future hiring procedures. 
 VI.  POSTSCRIPT 
After the foregoing article had been completed, but before it was 
printed, the Department of Justice announced a settlement agreement with JP 
Morgan Chase and JP Morgan Securities (Asia Pacific).224 Both accepted that 
certain senior executives and employees of the company conspired to engage 
in quid pro quo agreements with Chinese officials to obtain investment 
banking business, planned and executed a program to provide specific 
personal benefits to senior Chinese officials in the position to award or 
influence the award of banking mandates, and repeatedly falsified or caused 
 
 223 See generally Exec. Order No. 13,490, 74 Fed. Reg. 4673 (Jan. 21, 2009) (including a “revolving 
door ban” which prohibits both dealing with a matter of a former employer for two years and dealing with 
the government for your new employer when you leave the government for a period of two years (if 
covered by 18 U.S.C. § 207(c)). 
 224 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, JPMorgan’s Investment Bank in Hong Kong Agrees to Pay $72 
million Penalty for Corrupt Hiring Scheme (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/jpmorgan-s-
investment-bank-hong-kong-agrees-pay-72-million-penalty-corrupt-hiring-scheme; Press Release, U.S. 
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, JPMorgan Chase Paying $264 Million to Settle FCPA Charges (Nov. 17, 2016), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-241.html. 
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to be falsified internal compliance documents in place to prevent the specific 
conduct at issue here.225 
The total settlement was $264 million with $72 million to the 
Department of Justice, $130 million to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission and $62 million to the Federal Reserve.226 However the 
company was able to extract a non-prosecution agreement from the 
government although part of the investigation is still ongoing.227 JP Morgan 
disciplined over twenty employees and fired six.228 They had hired over 
“. . .two hundred interns as well as full time employees based on 
recommendations from clients, potential clients and foreign government 




 225 Letter from Dep’t of Justice to Mark Mendelsohn, Esq., Counsel for JP Morgan 2 (Nov. 17, 2016), 
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Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, JPMorgan Chase Paying $264 Million to Settle FCPA Charges (Nov. 17, 2016), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-241.html; Press Release, Fed. Reserve (Nov. 17, 2016), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/enforcement/20161117a.htm. 
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